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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, to review all decisions of the district courts 
involving domestic relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity under Section 78-2a-3(h) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court granted the Appellee's Motion To Dismiss/Motion For 
Summary Judgment. The issues to be decided on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Petitioner's 
Complaint with prejudice. Because the District Court applied Utah's Common 
Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, in 
dismissing the Petitioner's Complaint, the review presents a question of law 
and one reviewed under a correctness standard. Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen, 
907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995). Also, in reviewing a district court's dismissal 
of a complaint pursuant to summary judgment, the review is one of correctness. 
Taylor v. Qgden Sch. Dist.. 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). When construing 
a statute, the reviewing authority must give effect to the intent of the legislature 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Craftsman Builder's 
Supply v. Butler Mfg.. 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999). 
2. Whether the District Court erred in holding that the Appellee had 
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not waived any defenses to the Appellant's action A review of a district court's 
determination is a question of law reviewed for correctness Plateau Mm v 
Utah Div Of State Lands, 802 P 2d 720 (Utah 1990) 
3. Whether the District Court erred in finding Utah's Common Law 
Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4 5 U C A (1953), as amended, constitutional 
and rejecting arguments that the statute is one of limitations or repose A 
review presents a question of law with no deference given to the trial court 
Warren v Melville, 937 P 2d 556 (Ut App 1997) However, a strong 
presumption exists that a statute is constitutional with doubts resolved in favor 
of its constitutionality IcL 
4. Whether the District Court erred in failing to award the Appellee 
attorneys fees and costs and whether he is entitled to them on appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action by the Appellant/Petitioner seeking to establish a 
common law marriage under Section 30-1 4 5 U C A (1953), as amended, in 
order to obtain a division of properties owned by the Appellee/Respondent and 
an award of alimony in the form of a decree of divorce 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Appellant and Appellee were married on February 25, 1969, and 
divorced in 1980 (R 33) Shortly thereafter, they decided to reside together 
and did so until July 7, 1996, when they separated for the final time (R 33) 
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The Appellant filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court on 
October 7, 1996, seeking to establish a common law marriage (R 1) Her 
Complaint also sought, inter aha, a decree of divorce and an award of the 
Appellee's assets, an allocation of debts, and an award of alimony 
The Appellee answered the Complaint on February 14, 1997 and set 
forth as an affirmative defense that the Appellant had failed to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted 
Thereafter, the Appellant did nothing to move the case to trial or to 
establish the marriage relationship Indeed, the only requests for a trial date 
were filed by the Respondent.1 It is undisputed that the Appellant failed to 
establish any common law marriage relationship between the parties either 
during their relationship or within one year following the termination of the their 
relationship (R 209, R 223 ) 
During the course of the proceedings, the parties engaged in discovery 
The Appellant also filed a Motion For Order To Show Cause seeking 
temporary spousal support on August 29, 1997 (R 21) The parties settled this 
Motion prior to hearing with the Appellee voluntarily agreeing to pay temporary 
alimony pending trial on the condition that such agreement could not be 
construed as an admission or precedent for an alimony award at trial (R 67) 
1 rhe Appellee s first request was filed on Februan 14 1997 (R 9) The Appellee s second request was 
filed on September 29 1997 (R 59) 
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Trial was scheduled for August 12, 1998. Oi1 At igiis! 10, 1998, the 
Appellee mailed and faxed to opposing counsel a Motion To Dismiss. (R. 124-
125). The Motion to Dismiss was based on Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure because the Appellant had failed to establish a common law 
marriage relationship within one year following the termination of the parties' 
relationship. (R. 126-129). I I le Motioi i r o Disn iiss was filed with the Court on 
August 12, 1998, the day of trial. 
On August 12, 1998, before trial, the parties' counsel discussed the 
Appellee's Motion I o Dismiss in chambers with the trial court, the Honorable 
Anne M. Stirba, presiding. After having discussed the matter off record, the 
parties went on record and argued their respective cases concerning the 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. (Transcript of Proceedings, 8/12/99, p. 3). The 
Court then recessed and convened again in chambers. (Id., p. 18). At that 
time, the Appellant asked that tl le trial be continued and that the Appellai it be 
given the opportunity to prepare and file a responsive brief to the Appellee's' 
Motion To Dismiss. (Id.). The Court suggested that the matter be re-filed by 
the Appellee in the form of a Motion For Summary Judgment. (Id., p. 19). The 
Court stated that it may refer the matter to the domestic relations commissioner 
for a decision in accordance with the Code of Judicial Administration. (Id., p. 
20). On August 17, 1998, the Appellee filed a combined Motion To Dismiss 
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and Motion For Summary Judgment.2 (R. 141). This time, the motion was 
made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Id.). 
Judge Stirba referred the matter to the domestic relations commissioner. 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans heard oral argument from both parties on 
November 17, 1998, and took the matter under consideration. Commissioner 
Evans entered a Minute Entry on December 2, 1998 recommending that the 
Appellant's Motion be granted and recommending the Appellant's Complaint be 
dismissed. (R. 209). A formal order was prepared dismissing the action. (R. 
222). 
Thereafter, on December 14, 1998, the Appellant objected to 
Commissioner Evan's recommended order. (R. 214). Judge Stirba heard oral 
arguments once again on February 11, 1999. (R. 227). Judge Stirba 
concluded that Commissioner Evan's decision was correct, concluded that the 
Appellee's motion to dismiss should be granted, but denied the Appellee's 
request for attorney's fees and costs. (Id). A formal order styled Order 
Denying Petitioner's Objections and Order Dismissing Action was entered by 
Judge Stirba on March 2, 1999. (R. 228). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
2 At the time, the Appellee also filed a Motion to Amend Answer and an Amended Answer to remove am 
doubt concerning the Appellant's position that the Respondent had failed to comph with Utah's Common 
Law Marriage Statute (R 131-135) 
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The District Court granted the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss/Summary 
Judgment dismissing the Appellant's action with prejudice on March 2, 1999. 
(R.228). The District Court denied the Appellee's request for attorney's fees at 
the same time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The dispositive facts in this case are not disputed. The Appellant and 
Appellee were married on February 25, 1969, and divorced in 1980. (R. 33). 
Shortly thereafter they decided to reside together and did so until July 7, 1996, 
when they separated tor the final time. (R.33). The Appellant tilpd her action 
in the Third Judicial District Court on October 7, 1996. (R.1). No proceeding 
was initiated or obtained by the Appellant to establish the common law 
relationship either during their relationship or within one year of their 
separation as required by Section 30-1-4.5(2) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. . (R. 
209, R. 223.). Given these undisputed facts, the Appellant's case had no merit 
under the holding of Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) and 
should be dismissed. 
The Appellant acknowledges that she failed to follow the procedural 
requirements set forth in Section 30-1-4.5 and that Bunch disposes of her 
action. In an effort to avoid this conclusion, however, the Appellant advances 
arguments that require discussion of additional facts. These additional facts 
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are addressed below under subparagraphs relevant to the Appellant's 
arguments. 
Pleadings. The Appellant filed her Complaint on October 7, 1996. (R. 
1). The only reference to a common law marriage is contained in Paragraph 2 
of the Appellant's Complaint: 
"2. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband having first married 
in 1969 later divorced in 1980, however, they continued to reside 
together and held themselves out as husband and wife from 
February, 1980 to the date the (sic) separation on approximately 
July 7, 1996." 
As will be argued infra, the Appellee believed that the Appellant's Complaint 
was fatally deficient. Therefore, the Appellant responded, consistent with Rule 
11, to the common law allegations to the extent they were alleged, and 
admitted Paragraph 2 of the Appellant's Complaint, but also set up an 
affirmative defense under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as 
follows: 
"FIRST DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against 
the Defendant upon which relief may be granted." 
While it is true that the Appellee also admitted or denied allegations 
concerning relief that the Appellant was seeking, the Appellee believed, as 
argued below, that such a response was appropriate and consistent with Utah 
law in the area of domestic relations. 
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When the Appellee presented his Motion To Dismiss on August 12, 
1998, the Appellant asserted that the Appellee's pleading was ambiguous as to 
whether or not he admitted a common law relationship While not conceding 
that any ambiguity existed, the Appellee filed an Amended Answer to the 
Appellant's Complaint on August 17, 1998, to remove any question that the 
Appellee's pleading was ambiguous (R 131 and 136) The Amended Answer 
unequivocally stated that no common law marriage was entered into and that 
the Appellant's Complaint should be dismissed (Id ) 
Thereafter, with the lower Court's permission (Transcript of Proceedings, 
8/12/98, p 21), the Appellee re-filed his motion to dismiss in the form of a 
Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment (R 141) 
Timeliness The Appellee's initial Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum 
was faxed to the Appellant on August 10, 1998, two days before trial (R 124-
125, R 126-129) It was filed with the Court on the day of trial At trial, the 
Appellant initially argued against the Appellee's Motion To Dismiss (Transcript 
of Proceedings, 8/12/98, p 3) In addition, the Court continued the trial to 
allow the Appellant to fully brief the issues and to submit further oral argument 
(Id., p 15-16, 18-21) 
On August 17, 1998, the Appellee re-filed his motion in the form of a 
Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment (R 141) The 
Appellant replied by filing a Memorandum in Opposition To Motion To Dismiss 
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and Motion for Summary Judgment on August 26, 1998. (R. 150). As 
mentioned above, Judge Stirba then referred the matter to Domestic 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans for a decision. Commissioner Evans then 
took oral argument from both parties on November 17, 1998, and took the 
matter under consideration. Commissioner Evan's entered a Minute Entry on 
December 2, 1998, recommending that the Appellant's Motion be granted and 
recommending dismissing the Appellant's Complaint. (R. 209). A formal order 
was prepared dismissing the action. (R. 227). After Commissioner Evans 
entered a decision, Judge Stirba again took oral arguments from both parties, 
ruled against the Appellant, and entered a further order dismissing the action 
on March 2, 1999. (R. 228). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellee respectfully submits that Utah's Common Law Marriage 
Statute, Section 30-1-4.5, is a procedural statute whereby parties may 
establish a relationship as marital in nature by alleging and proving certain 
elements as required by the statute. Here, the Appellant wholly failed to follow 
the statute and failed to allege or prove the requisite elements. Under Bunch v. 
Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), the Appellant's action must be 
dismissed. 
The Appellee respectfully submits that his pleadings were not defective 
in any respect. To the extent that the Appellant made any allegations 
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concerning a common law relationship, the Appellee properly addressed them 
in his pleadings. However, the Appellant's Complaint wholly failed to state a 
cause of action for a common law marriage and the Appellee's affirmative 
defense, of failure to state a claim, was appropriate and sufficient to place the 
Appellant on notice that her Complaint was defective. 
The Appellee respectfully submits that both of his Motions, i.e., his initial 
Motion To Dismiss filed on August 12, 1998 and his Motion To Dismiss and 
Motion For Summary Judgement filed on August 17, 1998, were timely and that 
the Appellee did not waive any right to file the Motions. 
The Appellee respectfully submits that Utah's Common Law Marriage 
Statute is constitutional. It is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of 
repose but merely a procedure that must be followed by a party in order to 
establish a valid common law marriage in Utah. 
The Appellee respectfully submits that the trial court erred in not 
awarding the Appellee attorney's fees and costs and the Appellee seeks a 
recovery of those attorney's fees and costs below as well as on appeal. The 
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court remand for the purpose of 
ascertaining such fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT 
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A. Introduction. 
The District Court dismissed the Appellant's Complaint with prejudice 
because the Appellant did not comply with Utah's Common Law Marriage 
Statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. In doing so, the District 
Court primarily relied upon Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Ut.App. 1995) 
that is controlling in this action. The Appellant admittedly failed to properly 
allege or prove any compliance with the statute. Therefore, the District Court 
dismissed the Appellant's Complaint. The District Court's ruling was correct 
and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Recognizing these fatal defects, the Appellant attempted below, as she 
does on appeal, to misdirect the Court in its analysis of this case and argue 
that the Appellee's Motion To Dismiss was not timely and that the Appellee 
waived his Motion To Dismiss. The District Court likewise considered these 
two arguments and rejected them as having no merit. The District Court's 
ruling was correct on these issues and likewise should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
B. The Appellant Failed To Plead Or Prove Compliance With Utah's 
Common Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. 
The Statute. The State has had, and continues to have, a strong public 
interest in regulating marriages. The State's recognition of a valid marriage 
affects a great many things including, but not limited to, the legitimization of 
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children and the right to inherit. The State's right to regulate marriage through 
the passage of legislation cannot be denied. 
Accordingly, the State Of Utah through legislation has the right to grant 
or deny the right to marriage.3 For example, the State has the right, as it does, 
to prohibit incestuous marriages (Section 30-1-1) and to prohibit polygamous 
marriages, under-age marriages, and same-sex marriages (Section 30-1-2). 
There are strong public policy reasons why such is prohibited. 
The State also has the right, as it does, to regulate the procedures 
required to become married, such as the requirement for solemnization 
(Section 30-1-6) and the requirement to apply for and obtain a marriage license 
(Section 30-1-7 and 8) and to have such marriage licenses properly recorded 
(Section 30-1-12). These statutes serve a strong public interest in assuring 
that a number of obvious public policies concerning marriages and marriage 
relationships will be preserved. 
Utah did not recognize the validity of a common law marriage until 1987 
when Utah enacted Section 30-1-4.5. Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43 
P.2d 696 (Utah 1935). Therefore, neither the establishment of a common law 
marriage nor the remedy of a divorce from a common law relationship existed 
prior to 1987. 
3 Utah has had marriage statutes since 1898 when it became a state 
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When Utah's Legislature enacted Section 30-1-4 5, the Legislature knew 
and understood the significance and importance of the statutes granting 
"conventional" marriages The Legislature also knew of the mischief that could 
be easily created by enacting a common law marriage statute that had no 
criteria or procedures Therefore, the Legislature enacted a limited exception 
to the "conventional" procedure by which one could become married and 
enacted a common law marriage statute that set forth certain requirements, 
both substantive and procedural, that had to be satisfied before the State 
would acknowledge a valid common law marriage With the passage of 
Section 30-1-4 5, the Utah Legislature required the establishment of certain 
facts and the completion of certain procedures before a valid common law 
marriage would be legally recognized 
Pleading and Compliance The Appellant failed to properly plead a 
cause of action for a common law marriage or comply with the procedure in 
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute to establish a common law marriage 
Here, all the Appellant pleaded was that the "[parties] continued to reside 
together and held themselves out as husband and wife from February, 1980 to 
the date the (sic) separated on approximately July 7, 1996 " Section 30-1-
4 5(1) identifies the factors that must be established in order to allege the 
existence of a common law marriage 
"(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter 
shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order 
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establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting 
parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage 
under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabitated; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; 
and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform 
and general reputation as husband and wife." 
While no Utah Court has yet indicated the elements that must be pleaded in 
order to allege and state a cause of action, one may determine that the 
following elements are minimally necessary: 
(1) That a "relationship" existed that arose "out of a contract between 
two consenting parties"; 
(2) That the parties were "capable of giving consent"; 
(3) That the parties were "legally capable of entering into a 
solemnized marriage"; 
(4) That the parties "cohabitated"; 
(5) That the parties "mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and 
obligations"; 
(6) That the parties held "themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife"; and 
(7) That a "determination or establishment of a marriage" occurred 
during the "relationship" or "within one year following the 
termination of that relationship." 
In this case, the Appellant's Complaint failed to allege items (1), (2), (3), 
(5), and (7). When the Appellee filed his Answer, he set forth an Affirmative 
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Defense that the Appellant's Complaint failed to state a cause of action against 
him upon which relief could be granted. 
The procedure admittedly not followed in this case is Section 30-1-4.5(2) 
that requires the establishment of a common law marriage by a court or 
administrative agency either during the relationship or within one year of the 
termination of that relationship. It provides as follows: 
"(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subparagraph (1), or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this 
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under 
the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases." 
Under the facts of this case, the establishment of the common law 
marriage could have occurred at any time after the enactment of Section 30-1-
4.5 on July 1, 1987, until July 7, 1997, (one year after the parties separated). 
Procedurally, it had to have been established by either a court or administrative 
order within that time frame. Here, the Appellant had over 10 years to establish 
her claim of a valid common law marriage. Within that time frame, the 
Appellant had a year following her separation from the Appellee, from July 7, 
1996, to July 7, 1997, to establish her claim of a valid common law marriage. 
It is undisputed that the Appellant took no steps to comply with the statute and 
failed to obtain any court or administrative order establishing the relationship 
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during that time frame. It is undisputed that the Appellant took no efforts to 
even seek a hearing after her Complaint was filed on October 7, 1996.4 
Based upon the above, the District Court dismissed the Appellant's 
Complaint with prejudice because the Appellant failed to comply with Utah's 
Common Law Marriage Statute. The facts of this case are indistinguishable 
from those in Bunch v. Englehom, supra. There, the Plaintiff likewise failed to 
obtain a determination during the parties relationship or within one year of the 
termination of the parties relationship. The defendant in that action move to 
dismiss after opening statements on the basis that the trial court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction due to the Plaintiffs failure to comply with Utah's Common 
Law Marriage Statute. The trial court did so. The trial court's decision was 
upheld on appeal. This Court held that the "plain meaning" of the statute 
required the Plaintiff to obtain a "timely determination of her relationship with 
Englehom" and she failed to do so. k l , p. 921. The facts in the present case 
are identical. The District Court did not err in determining that Bunch was 
controlling and dismissing the Appellant's Complaint. The District Court's 
decision should be upheld. 
Point Two 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HAD 
NOT WAIVED ANY DEFENSES TO THE APPELLANT'S ACTION 
4 The only requests for a trial in this case were filed by the Appellee. One was on February 14. 1997. and the 
other was on September 29. 1997. (R. 9 and R. 59). 
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A. The Appellee's Motion To Dismiss Was Timely. 
The Appellant argued below, as she does on appeal, that the Appellee's 
Motion To Dismiss was not timely. The District Court ruled that the Appellee's 
Motion to Dismiss was timely. The District Court's ruling should be upheld 
here. 
The Appellant's primary complaint is that the Appellee filed his initial 
Motion To Dismiss the day trial was scheduled on August 12, 1998.5 However, 
it should be noted that the trial in this matter was continued without date in 
order for the Appellant to have sufficient time in which to prepare and file a 
responsive memorandum.6 Thereafter, the Appellee re-filed his Motion in the 
form of a Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment and the 
Appellant was given more than adequate opportunity to respond.7 
The Appellant's argument may have had some merit had the trial not 
been continued and she was not provided an adequate opportunity to respond. 
Yet, the trial was continued at the Appellant's own request. Having done so, it 
is quixotic to suggest that she may now continue to object to the timeliness of 
the Respondent's Motion 
5 The Appellee had previously faxed a cop\ of the Motion to Dismiss and accompammg memorandum to 
counsel on August 10. 1998 (R 124-125 and 126-129) 
6 The Appellant does not complain on appeal about not haung sufficient time in which to adequateh prepaie 
am defense to the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss 
7 Indeed, the Appellant lequested and recened an additional period of time in which to prepare a response to 
the Appellee's Motion (R 144-145) 
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The filing of the Motion to Dismiss on the day of trial by Appellee was 
proper in every respect. This was the same process and procedure permitted 
by the Court in Bunch v. Englehorn, supra. There, the defendant filed an 
answer to the plaintiff's complaint with an affirmative defense, as in the instant 
case, and moved to dismiss the plaintiffs action following opening arguments 
at trial. This Court rejected Bunch's claim that she was surprised by the oral 
motion to dismiss on the day of trial and ruled that the motion was timely. This 
Court stated, "Assuming, arguendo, that Bunch was surprised by the motion, 
she could have asked the trial court for a continuance and/or made a post-
judgment motion to present her issues to the trial court." Id, p. 921. 
The Appellee was not required to file his Motion To Dismiss at a point 
prior to trial as suggested by Appellant. The Appellee's Motion To Dismiss was 
made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under 
Rule 12(h), such a motion may be brought at any time including "at the trial on 
the merits." A motion going to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court may 
also be raised at any time. Bunch, supra, and Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P. 
Both Commissioner Evans and Judge Stirba found Appellee's Motion 
To Dismiss timely and rejected the Appellant's arguments. The Appellee 
respectfully submits that their decisions should be upheld. 
B. The Appellee Did Not Waive His Motion To Dismiss. 
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Statute Of Limitations Argument. The Appellant's first argument is that 
the District Court erred by rejecting the Appellant's argument that Utah's 
Common Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5(2), is, in reality, a "statue of 
limitations". And, by bootstrapping that argument, the Appellant argues that the 
Appellee waived the statute of limitations defense because he did not set forth 
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.8 
The District Court determined that Section 30-1-4.5(2) was not a statute 
of limitations and rejected the Appellant's argument The District Court 
concluded that the Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5(2) 
was not a statute of limitations but merely a procedure that permits a party to 
establish a common law marriage by complying with the requirements of the 
statute. (R.209-213, R. 222-226). Therefore, the Appellee was not required to 
set forth a "statute of limitations" affirmative defense in his pleadings. 
The District Court's decision should not be disturbed on appeal. Section 
30-1-4.5(2) is a procedure whereby a party, not having previously enjoyed a 
"conventional marriage", may obtain a determination that a common law 
marriage existed. In doing so, however, the statute mandates that certain 
requirements be met before a common law marriage relationship is 
established. If one fails to follow the procedures, the common law marriage 
8 The Appellee set forth the affirmati\e defense of failure to state a claim but no affirmative defense of a 
statute of limitations 
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relationship is not established. Statutes setting forth procedures to be 
followed, before a right, status, or privilege is conferred, are not uncommon. 
The Respondent submits that Utah's legislature possesses the 
discretion to enact statutes that establish time periods and procedures to be 
followed and that such statutes are presumptively constitutional. McHenrv v. 
Utah Valley Hospital 724 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D.Utah 1989). As held in Carrier 
v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 355 (Utah 1997), rules of procedure 
are presumed to be constitutional and any doubts are resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. 
The District Court's rejection of the Appellant's statute of limitations 
argument, and bootstrapped waiver argument, should be upheld by this Court. 
Pleadings. The Appellant argues that the Appellee admitted a common 
law marriage existed in his Answer and therefore waived any right to present 
his Motion To Dismiss. The District Court rejected the Appellant's argument 
and its decision should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Here, the Appellant filed an inartfully drafted complaint. Admittedly, one 
could divine that the Appellant attempted to plead a common law marriage. 
However, the statutory elements of a common law marriage were not pleaded 
including one very significant element, i.e., that a judicial determination of the 
relationship had occurred within one year of the parties' separation. 
Accordingly, the Appellee filed an Answer admitting (to the extent alleged) that 
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some elements of a common law relationship existed between the parties, but 
not all, and also set forth the affirmative defense that the Appellant's Complaint 
failed to state a cause of action against the Appellee.9 This was sufficient to 
put the Appellant on notice that her claim of a common law marriage against 
the Appellee was defective. Thereafter, the Appellant made no effort to satisfy 
the plain reading of the statute by either amending her Complaint or seeking a 
determination of the parties' relationship within one year of separation. 
Commissioner Evans ruled: 
"In his Answer, respondent did assert the affirmative defense of failure 
to state a cause of action, which is sufficient to put petitioner on notice 
as to potential motions. Further, the factual basis of respondent's 
Motion To Dismiss had not yet occurred at the time respondent filed 
his Answer as one year had not yet passed from the time of termination 
of the parties' alleged common law marriage relationship." (R. 210). 
Judge Stirba agreed with Commissioner Evans. In overruling the Appellant's 
objections to Commissioner Evans ruling, Judge Stirba obtained the 
Appellant's concession that it was the Appellant's burden to comply with Utah's 
Common Law Marriage Statute. (Transcript of Proceedings, 2/11/99, p. 16-17). 
Further, Judge Stirba opined that a waiver argument may not even be 
available to either party under Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute. (Id., p. 
17). This is because the argument assumes that the statute's specific 
9 The leasoning of Appellee m filing an Answer with an affirmatne defense, instead of immediateh filing a 
Motion To Dismiss to the Appellant's Complaint was that (a) the penod in which to establish the mantal 
relationship had not run and Appellee anticipated that the Appellant would file foi such a hearing within the 
time period and (b). e\en if the Appellant failed to do so within the time period, the Court still might ha\e 
power to diude joint assets and debts of paities who h\ed togethei based upon their stipulation to do so 
undei the decision m Jenkins \ Jenkins. 153 P 2d 261. 264 (Utah 1944) 
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requirement, that common law marriages be established only by "a court or 
administrative order", may be waived. She doubted that the legislature had 
that in mind. She suggested that a waiver argument would allow parties to 
evade the requirements of the statute. (Id). 
The Appellee respectfully argues that his Answer and affirmative 
defense appropriately put the Appellant on notice that her pleading was 
defective. The Appellant was obligated to move forward and comply with the 
statute and she failed to do so. At no time did the Appellant waive his defense. 
The Appellant's argument that the Appellee somehow waived his defenses by 
"acquiescense", i.e., by participating in his defense of the Appellant's 
Complaint and his trial preparation, is spurious. The Appellee is permitted by 
the rules to engage in discovery and is required by rule to attend the trial 
court's conferences. As stated supra, the Appellee's stipulation to a short 
period of temporary spousal support was made without precedent to any 
subsequent award of alimony. (R. 67). The District Court's holding rejecting 
the Appellant's waiver argument should be affirmed. 
In conclusion, the District Court properly ruled that the Appellant had 
failed to comply with Utah's Common Law Marriage statute and properly 
dismissed the Appellant's Complaint. The Appellant's arguments of timeliness 
and waiver were properly rejected by the trial court. The District Court's 
determinations should be upheld. 
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Point Three 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING UTAH'S COMMON LAW 
MARRIAGE STATUTE, SECTION 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
A. Introduction. 
The Appellant's argument that Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute, 
Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is unconstitutional was rejected 
by the District Court. The District Court rejected the Appellant's argument that 
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute was a statute of repose. (R.209-213, R. 
222-226). The District Court's determination was correct and should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
The Appellant argued below that Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute 
is either an unconstitutional statute of limitations or an unconstitutional statue 
of repose. The Appellant has apparently dropped her argument on appeal that 
the statute is an unconstitutional statute of limitations. In any event, the 
Appellee rejects both arguments and states that the statute is merely one of 
procedure. Viewed either as a statute of limitations, statute of repose, or as 
merely one of procedure, the statute is deemed presumptively constitutional. 
McHenrv v. Utah Valley Hospital supra, p. 837 and Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, supra, p. 355. Here, the Appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional. Snow v. Keddington, 195 
P.2d 234, 240(1948). 
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B. Section 30-1-4.5(2) Is Not A Statute Of Repose. 
First, the Appellee submits that Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not a statute of 
repose because the statute did not "abrogate a remedy" available to the 
Appellant under common law. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that 
a statute is not a statute of repose unless it extinguishes or abrogates a 
remedy that was available under common law. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 
1159, 1166 (Utah 1996); Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996); and 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 n.4, 680 (Utah 1985). In each 
of these two former cases, the Court upheld Section 63-30-4(4) against a 
statute of repose argument because it found that Section 63-30-4(4) did not 
abrogate an existing legal remedy available at common law. In Berry, supra, 
the Court indicated that an initial analysis should start with an inquiry 
concerning the nature of the remedy allegedly abrogated by the statute of 
repose and the substituted remedy. There must be some pre-existing remedy 
being abrogated by the alleged statute of repose before a court may inquire 
further. 
In this case, there was no right under common law in this state for a 
common law marriage. Here, the Appellant had no pre-existing marriage, right, 
or remedy that was abrogated by operation of Utah's common law marriage 
statute. The right to establish and claim a common law marriage in this state is 
a statutory right created by Section 30-1-4.5. Therefore, even assuming 
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Section 30-1-4.5(2) cuts off certain rights unless its procedures are met, it does 
not follow that the section is a statute of repose because no right existed under 
common law for common law marriages in this state. 
Second, Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not a statute of repose because it merely 
sets forth a procedure to be followed before a relationship is deemed a valid 
marriage. The Appellant did not have a valid marriage to begin with. The 
Appellant did not lose or forfeit any interest by operation of the statute as 
occurs in true statutes of repose. A statute of repose, like a statute of 
limitation, bars or terminates a pre-existing claim for relief. In this case, the 
Appellant had no claim for relief to be barred or terminated because she failed 
to follow the procedural requirements of the statute in order to validate her 
alleged marriage relationship. As stated above, statutes that prescribe 
procedures and time periods for parties to observe are presumptively valid. 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, supra. 
Therefore, Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not a statute of repose. 
C. Section 30-1-4.5(2) Is Not Unconstitutional 
Even If It Is Characterized As A Statute Of Repose. 
Not all statutes of repose are unconstitutional. 'To hold every statute of 
repose unconstitutional without regard to the legislative purpose could result in 
a legislative inability to cope with widespread social or economic evils." Berry, 
supra, page 680. Rather, the burden is upon the Petitioner to demonstrate that 
Berry's two part analysis has been met. This is not possible under the facts of 
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this case. 
The first prong of Berry requires the court to determine whether Section 
30-1-4.5 provides an injured person an effective and reasonable remedy to that 
remedy being abrogated by the statute. Indeed it does even assuming the 
statute abrogated a remedy existing at common law. The Appellant had from 
July 1, 1987, (the effective date of the statute) to July 7, 1997, (one year 
following the parties' separation) in which to established a valid marriage. She 
could have done this while the relationship was ongoing or within one year 
after its termination. The Appellant chose not to do so. The Appellant does not 
explain her failure to take advantage of this effective and reasonable remedy. 
The Appellant complains that one year is too short; however, statutes of 
limitations having similar time periods have been upheld. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 
P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) (also involving statutes of repose arguments). As 
indicated in Lee, the Legislature's fixing of lengths of times for limitations is 
afforded great latitude. Id., 575-576. Moreover, the Appellant was not limited 
to one year. She had over 10 years to establish her claim of a valid common 
law marriage. The barring of a remedy caused by the Appellant's own failure to 
take advantage of Section 30-1-4.5 within the time period afforded by statute 
does not afford her the right to complain. 
The Appellant's argument that Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not definitive 
concerning where to obtain a determination of the marriage relationship within 
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one year of separation is without merit. In the first place, the statute is clear 
that a party must establish the common law marriage relationship by "a court or 
administrative order." The plain meaning of the statute is that the moving party 
must seek either a judicial or an administrative determination. Here the 
Appellant filed her Complaint before the "Court" but made no effort to seek a 
"determination" or "establishment" by the Court. Second, the Bunch decision 
was issued in 1995. Any uncertainty concerning the procedure of the statute 
and how it operated was removed by Bunch prior to the filing of the Appellant's 
Complaint. Therefore, the Appellant cannot sustain her burden under Berry's 
first prong of analysis. 
Second, even if there were no substitute or alternative remedy provided 
as required by the first prong of Berry, the Court may still deem the abrogation 
justified if "there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means of achieving the objective." Id., page 680. In this case, Section 30-1-
4.5 does not abrogate any right but merely sets forth a procedure and time 
period for the establishment of rights attendant to a valid marriage. The 
statute's time periods and procedures, even if restrictive, are justified because 
clear social and economic evils would exist unless the statute were followed. 
As set forth above, the State has a vital interest in regulating marriages. 
Therefore, the Appellant cannot establish the second prong of the Berry 
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analysis. 
The Appellee respectfully submits that Utah's common law marriage 
statute is neither a statute of repose nor limitations and, even if it were 
characterized as such, it is not unconstitutional. The District Court's decision 
rejecting the Appellant's claim of unconstitutionality should be upheld on 
appeal. 
Point Four 
THE APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The District Court rejected the Appellee's claim for attorney's fees and 
costs. (R. 228-230). The District Court's decision was in error. As discussed, 
supra, the Appellant's obligation to establish her claim of a common law 
marriage within the time of the alleged relationship or one year thereafter was 
clear under the statute and Bunch. The Appellant simply failed to do so as 
required by the statute and Bunch. The Appellant's continued resistance to the 
trial court's decision dismissing her Complaint, with spurious and frivolous 
claims, is not proper and has resulted in substantial attorney's fees and costs. 
The Appellee should also be entitled to attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure. The 
Appellant continues to advance frivolous arguments to disguise her own 
failures in this case. The Appellant's arguments on appeal are not pursued in 
good faith, not warranted under existing law, and not made in good faith to 
extend, modify or reverse existing law. Cf. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Ut. 
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App 1987) 
The Court should remand to the District Court for the purpose of 
determining an award of fees and costs for the Appellee expended below and 
on appeal 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The decision of the District Court dismissing the Appellant's Complaint 
with prejudice should be upheld The Court should award attorney's fees and 
costs to the Appellee, incurred both before the trial court and on appeal, and 
remand the case to the District Court for the purpose of determining the amount 
of fees and costs 
DATED this )tf day of November, 1999 
STEPHEN W COOK 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is the attorney for Respondent herein; and that he served the 
attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE upon: 
LG CUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
560 East 200 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the 
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States 
mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 1*1 day of November, 1999. 
STEPHEN W COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this' n day of November, 1999. 
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